Allowances are not being made, by those who want a new England captain, for the quality of England's current opponents. These Australians will surely be ranked alongside their predecessors of 1948 and 1921 as the strongest of their touring teams. We should not forget that England have improved substantially this year, in line with administrative reforms at the top, to the point where they would now beat Zimbabwe.
Australia's four main bowlers form an almost complete attack, and every one of them is objectively rated higher than England's finest, Darren Gough. During the series the Australians have dropped half as many chances, six to England's 12, and their wicketkeeper has been on a plane above. While England's batting has withered on the vine, every one of Australia's batsmen has scored at least one hundred except Mark Waugh, and he can be expected to come good on the boot-filler of a pitch that is Trent Bridge after the initial life has evaporated.
Beyond their greater ability at cricket, these Australians have a killer instinct which has enabled them to seize England by the throat.
When Robert Croft refused to run a single in the over before lunch at Headingley on Monday, ostensibly because he did not want to face the hostility of Jason Gillespie, it was a defining, and abject, moment that completed Australia's superiority. The fate of the Ashes was decided then; this was the moment England surrendered them, and themselves.
Is Atherton to blame for Croft's hesitancy against the short ball? Or for the softness at the core of English cricket which is exposed when the going gets tough? Or for the England players having to serve two masters - some of them playing big cup games the day after a Test - while the tourists dedicate themselves to the Ashes? So much weaker is the England XI now that if a combined team were made from the two sides, Atherton himself would be the only home player for certain, replacing Mark Taylor, and possibly Gough or Nasser Hussain.
But there is another question. Could this England side, weaker though it is, have done more than it has done since Edgbaston? The reply has to be yes. In particular, when Australia have been batting and England have been fielding. Atherton's players have been too passive in their submission to a superior force. England have not only lost the last two Tests; they have gone down without sufficient fighting in the field, for which the captain has to be responsible.
The Australian desire to prey upon weakness and humiliate an opponent is not in Atherton's constitution, making him a pleasanter person and lesser captain. During the winter, when England were desperate to dismiss Zimbabwe's last man in Bulawayo and New Zealand's last man in Auckland, Atherton's field-settings could not have been further from intimidating his opponent. He is a born captain, but of such a defensive cast that he has to have a vibrant vice-captain to activate his players in the field, one more so than Nasser Hussain was last winter.
Passivity is part of Atherton's nature. In the authorised biography Athers, his father Alan tells of taking the young Michael to his cricket club at Woodhouses near Manchester. ``You would expect kids of that age to spend the afternoon running around. Not Michael. He would sit and watch and never used to move.' A low metabolism was ideal for withstanding the siege of Johannesburg until the South Africans were worn down and out. We cannot have it both ways.
Another early influence is not mentioned in the biography. His mother Wendy is open, emotional, Lancashire-lass effusive, and delightfully so, you would say - unless you were a shy son. Mike's reaction has been like that of his father: an increase in his reluctance to display any emotion in public. Nature and nurture have combined to produce the most undemonstrative of Englishmen. Which is fine, provided his captaincy is structured accordingly, which it has not been.
When he was made captain of England four years ago, Atherton had led a team to victory only once in a first-class match. And the captaincy which he had done at Cambridge was not appropriate. In two seasons, in 17 first-class matches, Cambridge never bowled a side out twice, and only four times did they dismiss a team once. Atherton became accustomed to patient fielding while opponents made massive totals, then to leading rearguard actions by example.
Instead of being made England captain in 1993, Atherton should have been allowed to lead Lancashire first, to learn how to win and get the best from his men. By being appointed then, he was also condemned to start on the wrong foot. Once the Ashes series at home had been formally lost, he had to take England to the West Indies that winter and to Australia the following winter, series which England were doomed as a cricketing certainty to lose. If Alec Stewart had been the captain until 1995, it would also have satisfied his lawful ambition and removed a tension which has occasionally chaffed.
The longest reign of any England captain was that of Peter May, of five years in effect. Assuming such a limit on Atherton's reign, it should have been obvious, even at the time of Gooch's resignation, that he would be better at captaincy from the age of 27 than when lacking experience of leadership and of winning at 25.
The nature of the tasks ahead should also be considered by those who want Atherton to go now, rather than arming him with an active vice-captain. In 1998 England have to go to the West Indies for five Tests, play five more at home to South Africa and one to Sri Lanka, then contest the Ashes in Australia. A similar, if slightly less demanding programme in 1994 proved too much for one captain, and for almost every other player. When the series in Australia ended, Atherton admitted to having ``hit the wall''.
It is therefore desirable that England next year should have two captains, each bringing his energy and ideas to bear and, for once, an orderly handover from one to the other. An astonishing fact is that the last eight England captains have all started on the wrong foot by losing their first Test, thanks to a lack of planning which has suddenly dumped the baby upon them. It would be a gracious act by Atherton if he were to stay on as vice-captain in name or effect, after handing over to Adam Hollioake.
Firstly, though, Hollioake must prove himself a Test batsman before he can be considered as vice-captain to Atherton, or as his successor, although he is already fit to lead England in the one-day tournament in Sharjah in December and in the one-day series which concludes the tour of the West Indies. To this future end, and to revive England's early-season spirit, Hollioake senior should bat at six at Trent Bridge, behind Atherton, Butcher, Hussain, Thorpe and Crawley. Russell should be recalled to keep wicket as Stewart has made one first-class fifty this summer apart from his 271 not out against Yorkshire, and has not attacked the bowling as he did in the winter. England will need Stewart in the West Indies though, for his batting.
Atherton well knows Trent Bridge as a batting ground since four of his six home Test hundreds have been made there. After losing in four days of playing time at Old Trafford and three at Leeds, England's realistic hope is a bore-draw, using Phil Tufnell over the wicket, followed by a win at the Oval to sneak a 2-2 share, and never mind the Ashes. Going bravely for broke at Trent Bridge, given the gulf between the teams, is more likely to lead to a result of 4-1 to Australia, then to Atherton's departure. And yet another hasty succession might send English cricket back to square one.